1st Alabama Cavalry - Est. 1862
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It is with great sadness that I announce the passing of Glenda McWhirter Todd. She passed away on September 3, 2017 surrounded by her family. She was a historian, genealogist, and author who prided herself on being a descendant of Andrew Ferrier McWhirter of the 1st Alabama Cavalry, USV. Her work over the past two decades and her dedication to the 1st Alabama Cavalry has created a legacy that will last for years to come.

Her life's work has touched thousands of people through the years, and I am glad that I had the pleasure to work with her as long as I did. My hope is that her work will live on for years to come to educate and inspire a new generation.


Excerpts from the Official Records Concerning the 1st Alabama
Series 1, vol 39, Part 1 (Allatoona)

page 767-771

HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,Savannah, Ga., January 15, 1864.

MAJOR: In resuming the narration of the operations of this DIVISION it becomes necessary to recur briefly to the condition of affairs in and about Allatoona.

My last report brought us to the 6th of October. That portion of Rowett's brigade left at Rome when I went to Allatoona joined me late on the night of the 5th, and on the morning of the 6th Colonel Martin brought up the First Brigade, making the garrison at Allatoona to consist of two brigade of this DIVISION and one of the THIRD DIVISION, Fifteenth Army Corps. The delay in the arrival of these re-enforcements, as has already been explained, was occasioned by the heavy rains that occurred in the early part of October. The Second Brigade, of this DIVISION, garrisoned Rome. General Raums brigade, of the THIRD DIVISION, occupied Kingston and Cartersville, between Rome and Allatoona. General Sherman still retained his headquarters near Kenesaw, his army distributed about its base. Owing to the condition of the roads the troops that were directed to the relief of Allatoona from the south did not make sufficient progress to intercept Stewart's corps, of Hood's army, which, after the repulse at Allatoona, withdrew in the direction of Dallas, forming a junction with the main body of the enemy late on the night of the 5th. Hood's army disappeared from its position about Dallas on the 6th, and its destination not being developed, General Sherman, apprehensive that the enemy might attempt to seize the bridge across the Etowah, either at Cartersville or Kingston, and Allatoona being safe by the near approach of his force, directed me to retire across the Etowah, to assure the safety of the above mentioned points and the line of the railroad. The troops were occupied on the 6th in strengthening the position and gathering the rebel dead and wounded and the arms that were strewn over the field.

Early on the morning of the 7th my command moved to Cartersville and lay there in bivouac, while I endeavored to secure all possible information of the whereabouts of Hood. Late in the day I received a communication from General Sherman that his cavalry were following Hood and that the enemy were too far south to make the Etowah bridge via Stilesborough. Not being able to develop any force along the left bank of the Etowah between the bridges, I directed the column to move on Rome, via Kingston, the next day, and took the cars myself in the evening of the 8th, arriving at Rome about 9 p. m. Here I found that the late freshet had swept away the two pontoon bridges that connected Rome with the opposite banks of thituated at the confluence of these two streams, which run parallel on either side of the city for quite a distance, then gradually approaching, their waters mingle and form the Coosa) is commanded on the left bank of the Etowah where that stream joins the Coosa. The peninsula, on which the town is located, embraced our depot for supplies and ordnance and the extensive hospitals organized for the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by the eminence to which we gave the name of Cemetery Hill. If Hood was approaching Rome, as was generally supposed, it was important that we should secure this hill and fortify it, as it was the key to the place. Finding on my return that all force had been withdrawn into the garrison, I directed a small outpost to be thrown across in boats on Cemetery Hill, sent for the chief of the pioneer corps, and ordered him to proceed at once to build a pontoon bridge across the Etowah at that point, giving him control of all mechanics, saw-mills, and available material in the place. Thanks to Captain Longstreth's energy, I was enabled by noon of the 9th to throw an infantry force onto Cemetery Hill and secure it. Some idea may be gathered of the promptness with which the bridge was built when I state at midnight of the 8th the trees were standing in the streets of Rome that at noon of the next day furnished balk and chess for a bridge over which infantry, cavalry, and artillery passed.

The two brigades that left Kingston on the morning of the 6th arrived at Rome just as the bridge was finished. Detachments of cavalry from Colonel Spencer's regiment were sent out to patrol the roads leading south from Rome. Scouts and spies had been sent out during the night of the 8th. Two deserters came in and reported that Hood was moving toward Blue Mountain, leaving Cedartown and Cave Spring on his right. I had been receiving intelligence by telegraph from General Raum at Cartersville, and from General Cox, commanding Twenty-THIRD Corps, at Allatoona, both reporting that deserters had arrived at their headquarters, stating that Hood's entire army was moving on Rome. General Sherman telegraphed later in the day that he felt satisfied that Hood would strike Rome, and directed me to make a stubborn fight behind breast-works; that he would re-enforce me with 50,000 men as quick as they could be marched to Rome. Every ax, shovel, and pick had been early called into requisitions, and every preparation made to receive Hood and his army. However, no information could be obtained from our front till about midnight of the 9th, when some of the patrols, spies, and scouts commenced coming in, corroborating the intelligence received from Generals Sherman, Raum, and Cox, and that Hood's army was within twelve miles of us. At 3 a. m. of the morning of the 10th captain Peek, of the First Alabama Cavalry, brought in some prisoners belonging to Walthall's and Loring's DIVISIONS, of Stewart's corps. The captain, having gallantly assaulted the enemy's outposts, drove them into their reserve; they in turn fell back into the main body, creating great commotion and confusion, under cover of which the captain made his escape, bringing with him quite a squad of prisoners, from whom I obtained positive information of the locality of Hood's different corps. They, however, could give no decided opinion of Hood's object or destination. It was evident that he did not intend attacking Rome, as his heads of column had crossed the road leading into Rome, and were directed on the Coosa River, over which the prisoners thought Hood was effecting a crossing. At daylight of the 10th this opinion was confirmed by a spy coming in and stating that he had been in the enemy's camp, where Lee's corps were laying a pontoon bridge over the Coosa, near Coosaville, twelve miles distant from Rome. Reports became more frequent, and Hood's position and movements gradually developed. Hood arrived at Cedartown on the morning of the 9th, placing one corps at Cave Spring (Lee's), one at Cedartown (Hardee's), one at Vann's Valley (Stewart's). Two days' rations had been cooked, and the command commenced crossing the pontoon bridge at Coosaville at daylight on the morning of the 10th in the following order: Wheeler's cavalry, followed by Lee and Hardee, crossed during the morning; latackson's cavalry and the men that were unfit to march, to take up the bridge and move it farther down the river. General Sherman arrived at Kingston with the Twenty-THIRD Corps on the evening of the 10th and there waited for their developments. about 11. 30 p. m. of the 10th Wheeler's cavalry moved up the right bank of the Coosa, and struck my pickets at the forks of the Alabama and Summerville roads. Without making any further demonstration they moved off on the Summerville road and camped at the bridge over the Armuchee. On the evening of the 11th I further ascertained, by the aid of the First Alabama Cavalry and some deserters, that Hardee's corps, then commanded by Cheatham, had passed up by the road leading from Coosaville to the bridge over the Armuchee. The other two corps had passed up the main Chattooga Valley, via Alpine and Summerville. This information, as rapidly as it was procured, was telegraphed to General Sherman. General Howard sent a brigade from Second DIVISION, Fifteenth corps, commanded by Colonel Fowler, which arrived on the cars about noon of the 11th, and was placed in camp ready for any emergency. General Sherman arrived on the 12th, and his army encamped within three miles of Rome. On the 13th, by order of General Sherman, I moved my DIVISION, augmented by Colonel Fowler's brigade and Colonel Spencer's regiment of cavalry, across the Etowah, and with Colonel Hurlbut's brigade in advance, the other three brigades in supporting column the cavalry on the flanks, we advanced on Cave Spring for the purpose of developing the character and strength of the enemy's force lying near the pontoon bridge on which they crossed over the Coosa. Armstrong's and Gholson's brigade of cavalry, of Jackson's DIVISION, opposed us for about seven miles, with but very slight loss to ourselves. The enemy were driven back toward Cave Spring by the infantry, while I sent the cavalry to the point opposite Coosaville, where Hood had his pontoons, which were found to be gone and no enemy there. I received about 3 p. m. a note from General Sherman stating that "Hood had appeared before Resaca, and s" that I would immediately withdrawal my forces and return to Rome, which I did at once, reversing the order of march, placing the cavalry in rear, arriving at Rome at 8 p. m., making a march of nearly twenty- five miles. General Sherman directed that I should occupy Rome with my DIVISION, while the army moved to Resaca in pursuit of Hood. On the morning of the 14th General Sherman left Rome with that portion of his army that had not moved the preceding day to Resaca, and I was left to keep in check and watch the cavalry lying south and WEST of Rome. Later in the day I received a telegram from General Sherman, at Resaca, directing me to move with above 2,500 men and a section of artillery on the Summerville road, demonstrating against Hood's right and rear. On the morning of the 15th two brigades, with a section of artillery and a regiment of cavalry, moved out as directed, struck a cavalry force of the enemy about three miles from town, and drove them to Kinney's Creek, capturing about a dozen prisoners and a portion of General Allen's staff. The enemy crossed and destroyed the bridge, which then prevented farther pursuit. We ascertained from the prisoners and citizens that Wheeler's headquarters were at Dirt Town, and that Hood was falling back from the railroad toward La Fayette. This intelligence was immediately communicated to General Sherman, and the command returned to Rome. Cavalry patrols and infantry reconnoitering parties were sent out on the different roads leading from Rome WEST and south, and increasing vigilance exercised to procure information of the enemy's movements and his whereabouts. On the 17th General Sherman occupied Ship's Gap and La Fayette, while Garrard lay near Dirt Town. From General Sherman I received an order directing me to open communication with Garrard and to threaten Coosaville. He further communicated that Hood was retiring by Summerville and Alpine, and instructed me, if I found a favorable opportunity, to strike Hood in flank with my whole force. He further directed, as he intended following Hood to the Coosa, that I should build another bridge across the Oostenaula and have 500,000 rations brought to Rome for his command. On the 21st General Sherman arrived at Gaylesville, and notified me that Hood had retreated to Gadsden, followed by Garrard's cavalry; that he intended crossing the Coosa, near Gaylesville, and occupying Center, and directed that I should float sufficient pontoons down the river to enable him to cross his command. Center is forty miles distant from Rome, by the river. The left bank swarmed with Jackson's cavalry and one brigade of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, under Colonel Spencer, moved toward Cave Spring, to divert the enemy and cover the passage of the boats. Sixteen boats ladened with the necessary balk, chess, rope, and a guard of 100 men, were gently placed in the water, and on the right of the 22nd floated down the Coosa, arriving at Center, without any loss, in time to complete the bridge on the 24th. The activity of the DIVISION during the operations of the army about Rome was incessant, and, I have reason to believe, proved of great service to the commanding general. Rome, becoming the depot of supplies for the army, created, in addition to the military duties, onerous tasks for all officers and men. Four pontoon bridges were made by the DIVISION pioneer corps during the operations, two of which over the Oostenaula were used by the trains passing from the army at Gaylesville to Rome, the THIRD across the Etowah, used by the garrison, and the fourth was sent, as has been previously stated, down the Coosa for the use of the army at Center. In addition to these the pioneers had nearly completed the frame work for a substantial truss bridge across the Etowah. Heavy fatigue details were constantly required to load and unload supplies for the army, and to the credit of the command I state that the officers and men labored night and day unremittingly and with commendable zeal. On the 28th of October theof the Coosa, en route for Atlanta, and I was directed by the commanding general to have the command refitted, and all sick and wounded and surplus baggage removed to Chattanooga, preparatory to a long and arduous campaign. The destruction of the railroad north of Resaca prevented the removal of the patients in the hospital until cars be forwarded. When the repairs were made, such was the increased demand for them between Atlanta and Chattanooga that I was unable to secure but few at a time, and the work of removal went on slowly.

On the evening of the 4th the following communication was received from Major-General Sherman:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 4, 1864.

Brigadier General John M. CORSE,

Commanding Fourth DIVISION, Fifteenth Army Corps, Rome, Ga.:

GENERAL: The commanding general directs that on receiving notice to evacuate Rome by telegraph, of which he will give you as much notice in advance as circumstances will permit, that you destroy in the most effective manner, by fire or otherwise, all foundries, bridges, shops of all kinds and descriptions, barracks, and buildings especially adapted to armed used, lumber or timber, as also all cars off the track or materials that cannot be removed, and then remove your command, via Kingston and Allatoona, to Marietta and report to General Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY HITCHCOCK,

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Every effort was made to procure cars for the speedy removal of the sick and wounded, the refugees with which the town was crowded, the stores and munitions of war that were captured with the place or had accumulated since its occupancy. The pontoons were hauled out of the river and piled up to dry for burning, the machinery in foundries and mills broken and destroyed so as to be unfit for use. The large pieces of ordnance for which transportation could not be procured were either burst or spiked and the trunnions knocked off, and every preparation made for a speedy and quiet evacuation of the city when orders might be received. The difficulty in obtaining cars rendered it necessary to abandon a great deal of valuable public property and officers' baggage when the orders came, which were as follows, received on the 10th of November:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,Kingston, Ga., November 10, 1864.

Brigadier General J. M. CORSE,

Commanding, Rome, Ga.:

In execution of sealed orders, Numbers 115, you will destroy to- night all public property not needed by your command, all foundries, mills, workshops, warehouses, railroad depot, or other houses convenient to the railroad, together with all wagons shops, tanneries, or other factories useful to our enemy, destroy their bridges completely, and then move your command to-morrow to Kingston and beyond, passing General Davis' command, after which proceed by easy marches until you overtake your corps, and report to its commander.

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General.

All troops were moved from town and immediate vicinity and strong guards and patrols were established, every precaution taken to prevent the spreading of the flames to private residences, and at 10 o'clock on the evening of the 10th the property destined for destruction was in flames.

At daylight on the morning of the 11th the column was moving to Kingston. Captain Burnham, provost-marshal, reported to me that so well were the orders executed by the provost-marshal guard that there was not a private residence burned or a family disturbed. *

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO M. CORSE,

Brigadier-General.

Major MAX. WOODHULL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

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